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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dale Patterson pied guilty to two counts of
delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), as well as a sentencing
enhancement (five years fixed) under I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(1) for having a prior conviction
for a similar offense. The district court interpreted I.C. § 37-27398 as creating a true
mandatory minimum sentence and, therefore, it ruled that it had no discretion to
suspend the five year fixed sentence, or retain jurisdiction over Mr. Patterson.
Ultimately, it imposed two concurrent unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years
fixed. The district court explained that, in its view, the fixed portion of those sentences
was required under section 37-27398 but, even if such a mandatory minimum did not
exist, it would have exercised its discretion in favor of the sentence ultimately given.
Mr. Patterson appeals. He argues first that the district court abused its discretion
by imposing, and ordering into execution, the sentence that it did.

As part of this

argument, he contends that, given the record in this case, the district court should have
granted him an opportunity to earn a chance at probation by placing him in the retained
jurisdiction ("rider") program. Mr. Patterson also argues that the district court erred in
concluding that a rider was not a legal sentencing option in this case.
Mr. Patterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and
remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider. Alternatively, he requests that
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence or remand his case for a
new sentencing hearing.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Dale Patterson is a drug addict. (Interviewer's Assessment, p.4 (Mar. 13, 2008).)
He started drinking and smoking marijuana when he was only ten years old.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.) As a teen, Mr. Patterson
smoked marijuana "all the time," began using cocaine heavily and, in his late teens,
even started using methamphetamine. (PSI, p.9.)
In 1989, when he was 22 years old, Mr. Patterson completed a 28-day residential
treatment program at ARA House in Idaho Falls for his cocaine addiction. (Interviewer's
Assessment, pp.1, 2, 3 (Mar. 13, 2008).)

It appears that that program helped

Mr. Patterson overcome his cocaine addiction; however, he did continue to use
marijuana and, obviously, methamphetamine after completing the program. (See
Interviewer's Assessment, pp. 2, 4 (Mar. 13, 2008).)
In 2001, at the age of 35, Mr. Patterson was convicted of a single count of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (PSI, p.5.) The record does
not reveal what that controlled substance was, but one would guess that it was
methamphetamine.

Mr. Patterson received a unified sentence of seven years, with

three years fixed for that offense. (PSI, p.5.) After serving his fixed time, Mr. Patterson
was paroled in August of 2003.

(PSI, p.5.) He stayed clean at least until he was

discharged from parole in September of 2005. (PSI, p.5; see PSI, p.9.)
Sadly, in 2007, after six years of sobriety, including more than a year where he
was not supervised by the State in any way, Mr. Patterson relapsed and began using
methamphetamine again. (PSI, pp.3, 9, 10.) Immediately, his methamphetamine use
became a daily habit and, before long, he was injecting it intravenously. (PSI, p.9.) In
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order to support his methamphetamine addiction, Mr. Patterson then began to sell
drugs. (Sent. Tr., p.34, Ls.19-21; PSI, p.3.)
On October 4 and 12, 2007, Mr. Patterson sold small amounts (2.5 grams and
2.3 grams, respectively) of methamphetamine1 to a confidential informant and/or an
undercover police officer. (R., pp.18-19; Plea Tr., p.11, L.7-p.13, L.5.)
On January 14, 2008, Mr. Patterson was charged with two counts of delivery of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine).

(R., pp.13-16.)

As to each of the two

counts, he was also charged with two separate sentencing enhancements-one for
delivering methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school (I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(2)), and
one for having been previously convicted of delivery of a controlled substance
(I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(i)).
After Mr. Patterson waived his preliminary hearing (R., pp.29, 30), he was bound
over into the district court (R., p.31 ). The State filed its Information on February 20,
2008. (R., pp.32-35.)
At some point, Mr. Patterson's bond was reduced (R., pp.39-41) such that he
was apparently. able to bond out of jail on certain conditions, including the requirement
that he submit to drug testing (urinalyses) three times per week. (See R., pp.48, 87;
Plea Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.4.)

1

The amounts of methamphetamine sold were each slightly more than a "teener,"
a sixteenth of an ounce.
City of Boise Website (available at<http://www.
cityofboise.org/Departments/Police/DrugEducationAndResources/Drugldentification/pag
e5807.aspx>). It is probably safe to label a teener as a "personal use" amount, given
that Mr. Patterson used an "8 ball," an eighth of an ounce, or twice as much as a teener,
the last time he used methamphetamine, i.e., the day he was arrested. (See
Interviewer's Assessment, p.1 (Mar. 13, 2008).)
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On March 20, 2008, while Mr. Patterson was out on bond, he voluntarily began
attending Intensive Outpatient ("IOP") Treatment at the Walker Center in Gooding.
(R., p.87; Interviewer's Assessment, p.1 (Mar. 13, 2008).) A progress report, covering

the period from April 7, 2008, through May 7, 2008, indicated that, to that point,
Mr. Patterson had attended all of his group sessions and actively participated in those
sessions in a positive way, and was making progress toward his goal of sober living.
(Walker Center Outpatient Program Monthly Progress Report (May 7, 2008).)
successfully completed the IOP program on May 28, 2008.

(R., p.87.)

He

Afterward,

Walker Center staff described the progress that Mr. Patterson had made in the program,
explaining that he had "internalized his motivation for remaining clean and sober,"
"place[d] his recovery as a top priority in his life," "expressed accountability and
accepted responsibility for his actions," and "still attend[ed] treatment and [did]
everything he could to be stable in his recovery" despite the ongoing distraction of his
criminal case. (R., p.87.)
In the meantime, on or about May 5, 2008, Mr. Patterson entered into a plea
agreement with the State.

(See R., p.59.)

Under the terms of that agreement,

Mr. Patterson agreed to plead guilty to both counts of delivery of a controlled substance,
as well as one of the two enhancements for having a prior drug-related conviction.
(R., p.59.) In exchange, the State agreed to: (1) dismiss the second enhancement for

the prior conviction, as well as both school zone-based enhancements; (2) refrain from
filing a persistent violator enhancement or any additional charges relating to the search
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of Mr. Patterson's camp trailer the day after he was arrested 2 ; and (3) recommend a
sentence of no more than fifteen years, with seven years fixed. (R., p.59.)
As noted, Mr. Patterson completed the IOP program on May 28, 2008.
Thereafter, he began attending Men's Relapse Prevention, a program which
presumably continued through the time of his June 16, 2008 sentencing hearing. 3 (See
R., p.87.)

As of the time of Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, he had substantially
complied with the terms of his release-appearing for all appointments in a timely
fashion, participating in all required drug tests, 4 and testing negative for drugs and
alcohol. 5 (R., p.89.) In addition to this information, the district court had before it the
PSI, detailing Mr. Patterson's history of addiction, as well as some of his recent
progress (see PSI, pp.9-10; Interviewer's Assessment (Mar. 13, 2008); Walker Center
Outpatient Program Monthly Progress Report (May 7, 2008)), a letter from the Walker
Center discussing Mr. Patterson's completion of the IOP program and success in
treatment as of the time of sentencing (see R., p.87), and letters of support from his
2

In the search of Mr. Patterson's camp trailer, the police found "several clear baggies
containing a white residue" believed by the police to be methamphetamine, a pipe
containing a white residue, empty plastic bags, and certain materials and equipment
that were consistent with the making of "crystal MSM, which is a cutting agent for
methamphetamine." (R., pp.94-95.) When Mr. Patterson was confronted with the
evidence found in his camp trailer, he admitted that an unidentified individual had
attempted to bring a portable meth lab into his trailer at one point, but that Mr. Patterson
had kicked him out. (R., pp.95-96.) Although Mr. Patterson admitted to making MSM,
he denied ever making, or attempting to make, methamphetamine. (R., pp.95-96.)
3
Apparently, Mr. Patterson was on a waiting list for a 28-day inpatient treatment
program (see Plea Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.24), but it does not appear that space in that
program opened up prior to his sentencing hearing.
4
After his initial success while out on bond, the district court reduced the drug testing
requirement to two times per week. (Plea Tr., p.15, L.19- p.16, L.4.)
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cousin and his daughter. 6

His cousin's letter informed the district court that

Mr. Patterson is a "good father" who "loves his children very much." (Letter from Anne
Dinrnan to Judge Bevan, p.1 (undated).) His eleven year-old daughter's7 letter bears
this out:
I love my father with all of my heart. l miss him terribly right now. If
he goes away even longer then you cannot imagine how much I'll miss
him. Every time I just think about him not being with me and my family I
cry. Every time I think a srnidge about him then I [bawl]. . . . I really love
him and I just want to be able to say my dad lives with me. . . . I love my
daddy to[o] much to lose him. I need him in my life . . . . My life is so
completely empty. Please don't let me [lose] him as much as I already
have. . . . Please send him to rehab so he can by my superdad again.
Tell him I love him with all my heart and always will ....
(Letter from Chelsea Patterson to Judge Bevan, p.1 (undated).)
At the hearing, Mr. Patterson offered statements from four witnesses in
mitigation. (See Sent. Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.13, L.10.) Greg Avery, Mr. Patterson's sponsor,
spoke of Mr. Patterson's success in the Crystal Meth Anonymous program, his progress
in dealing with "the issues that caused him to use," his intense desire to succeed in
recovery this time, his faith, and his work skills and ability to be a productive member of
society.

(Sent. Tr., p.8, L. 13 - p.9, L.22.)

Scott Flinn, an addict with 14 years of

sobriety behind him, discussed the change in Mr. Patterson's attitude and he suggested
that such change is critical to the recovery process and, thus, bodes very well for
Mr. Patterson.

(See Sent. Tr., p.10, L.6 - p.11, L.3.)

Larry Featherston, Jr.,

Mr. Patterson's boss at Horne Heating & Air Condition, offered a glowing assessment of
Mr. Patterson, describing Mr. Patterson's forthrightness about his addiction, and
5

The only requirement that Mr. Patterson failed to fully satisfy was the obligation to pay
all Court Compliance Program fees. (R., p.89.)
6
The letters are attached to the PSI.
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explaining what an asset Mr. Patterson was to the company. (Sent. Tr., p.11, L.14 p.12, L.4.) Mr. Featherston described Mr. Patterson at different times as a "tremendous
worker" and an "awesome worker."8 (Sent. Tr., p.11, L.14 - p.12, L.4.) Finally, Cindy
Bennett, Mr. Patterson's sister, spoke. (Sent. Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.13, L.10.) Just as her
cousin's letter had done, she described her brother as "an excellent father when he's
not on drugs," commenting that "[h]e's just there for his kids, and that's what they need."
(Sent. Tr., p.12, L.14 - p.13, L.10.) She also explained that the children's mother was
not a part of their lives and, a result, she (Ms. Bennett), a single parent herself, was
struggling to care for Mr. Patterson's children in addition to her own. (Sent. Tr., p.12,
L.20 - p.13, L.3.)
Despite Mr. Patterson's history of addiction, the role that it played in the present
offenses, his desire to break the chains of that addiction, and his recent successes in
beginning to do so, and despite the importance of Mr. Patterson to his sister and, most
importantly, his children, the district court denied defense counsel's request for a "rider"
(Sent. Tr., p.23, Ls.15-18), i.e., a period of retained jurisdiction. 9 Instead, the district

7

Mr. Patterson has two children, a boy and a girl. (PSI, p.7.) They were twelve and
eleven years old, respectively, at the time of Mr. Patterson's sentencing. (PSI, p.7.)
8
Mr. Featherston's remarks in open court were consistent with what he told the presentence investigator about Mr. Patterson. On that earlier occasion, Mr. Featherston
had described Mr. Patterson's job performance as "awesome" and had written as
follows: "He's very punctual & knows his job. He's an asset to our installation team. We
are hoping he will remain a full time employee." (PSI, p.9.) Notably, this is consistent
with what another former employer had recalled about him (even though he had not
worked for her since 1999)-she described him as a "good employee" and a "hard
worker," and had noted that "the crews liked him on job sites for his quality work." (PSI,

f-9.)
The district court ruled that a rider was not an option given the "mandatory minimum"
of I.C. § 37-2739B. (Sent. Tr., p.31, L.3 - p.33, L.10.) The district court further ruled,
however, that, even if it did have discretion to grant Mr. Patterson a rider, it would not do
so. (Sent. Tr., p.33, L.11 - p.36, L.25.)
7

court imposed two concurrent unified sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
(R., p.108; Sent. Tr., p.37, Ls.3-11.) In doing so, the district court acknowledged, at
least to a certain extent, the devastating impact its sentencing decision would have on
Mr. Patterson's children, but concluded, apparently, that the "greater good" of "sending
a message" to drug addicts outweighed that impact. (See Sent. Tr., p.35, L.14 - p.37,
L.11.)
On June 17, 2008, the district court entered its written judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.104-10.) Ten days later, on June 30, 2008, Mr. Patterson filed a timely notice of
appeal.

(R., pp.119-21.)

On appeal, Mr. Patterson contends that the district court

abused its sentencing discretion by imposing upon him a sentence which is excessive
given any view of the facts. He further contends that the district court erred in ruling that
neither a rider, nor a suspended sentence, is legally permissible upon imposition of a
"fixed minimum" sentence under I.C. § 37-2739B, and that this Court may, in fact,
remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider. Mr. Patterson respectfully
requests that this Court do just that, so that he may have an opportunity to earn a
chance at probation. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate
portion of his sentence or remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
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ISSUES
1.
Did the district court abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing upon
Mr. Patterson a sentence which is excessive given any view of the facts?
2.
May a defendant receive retained jurisdiction, or a suspended sentence, upon
imposition of a "fixed minimum" sentence pursuant to I.C. § 37-2739B?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Patterson A
Sentence Which Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts
Mr. Patterson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his concurrent unified
sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75
(1979)).

Mr. Patterson does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Patterson must
show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any
view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405
(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482
(1992)).

The governing criteria are derived from the four objectives of criminal

punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)).
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This Court reviews the length of the entire sentence in order to determine whether the
sentence is reasonable. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 725, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
As noted above, Mr. Patterson is a drug addict, and the district court specifically
found that his addiction factored prominently in the perpetration of the present offenses.
(Sent. Tr., p.34, Ls.19-21.) Both of these are facts which the Idaho courts have long
considered mitigating circumstances counseling toward lesser sentences. See, e.g.,
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91, 645 P.2d 323, 325 ("[T]he trial court did not give proper

consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the
problem.").

In addition, not only has Mr. Patterson voiced his acceptance of

responsibility for his actions and his willingness to overcome his addiction, 10 but, as
described above, he has actually "walked the walk" by voluntarily seeking out treatment,
working hard to stay sober, and meeting with a great deal of success in doing so. This
is another well-established mitigating factor which counsels toward a lesser sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529 (1982) (noting that

"since the incident and incarceration pending hearing, he has markedly changed his
dependency on prescription medication, with great improvement in his mental attitude
and stability," and holding that this factor, among others rendered the defendant's
sentence excessive).

10

Mr. Patterson told the pre-sentence investigator that his actions were "stupid" and that
he is willing to accept responsibility for them. (PSI, pp.3, 10.) He went on to explain
that he recognizes that he was foolish to think he could overcome his addiction on his
own, that he needs, and is willing to accept support from his church, professional
treatment providers, and his sponsor. (PSI, pp.3, 10.) Finally, he has made it clear that
he is committed to changing his life. (PSI, p.10.)
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In light of these facts, and looking at Mr. Patterson's case as a whole, it is clear
that his concurrent sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, are excessive. The
four objectives

of criminal

punishment are

not well-served

by warehousing

Mr. Patterson for at least the next five years; society will be best served if Mr. Patterson
is treated and allowed to become a contributing member as soon as possible. Indeed,
prison may very well hamper Mr. Patterson's recovery (which is especially tragic in this
case because he was doing so well prior to his sentencing hearing) and, thus, may
actually increase the risk to society. Moreover, while the district court was clearly very
concerned with both general and specific deterrence when it sentenced Mr. Patterson to
prison (see Sent. Tr., p.35, L.18 - p.36, L.5), one must seriously question the district
court's logic. With all due respect to the district court, it was naive to believe that a
prison sentence in this case will have any impact whatsoever on addicts who, because
of the nature of their addictions, lack the ability to make decisions that are in their best
long-term interests.
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Patterson asks this Court to hold that the district
court's sentence represents an abuse of discretion, and to vacate that sentence. He
requests that this Court remand his case with an order that he be granted a rider or, in
the alternative, that it reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence or remand his
case for a new sentencing hearing.

II.
A Defendant May Receive Retained Jurisdiction, Or A Suspended Sentence, Upon
Imposition Of A "Fixed Minimum" Sentence Pursuant To I.C. § 37-2739B
As noted, Mr. Patterson requests that, in the event that this Court concludes that
the district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a unified sentence of
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fifteen years, with five years fixed, this Court remand the case with an order that
Mr. Patterson be granted a rider. This request raises the question of whether a rider is
even legally permissible in this case.

Mr. Patterson contends that it is, and that the

district court erred when it ruled otherwise.
As noted, Mr. Patterson pied guilty, not only to the two charged offenses, but also
to one of the four charged sentencing enhancements-one of the two enhancements
arising out of his prior drug conviction.

That sentencing enhancement provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

37-27398. Fixed minimum sentences in drug cases . ...
(b) Any person who is found guilty of violating the provisions of
section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or of any attempt to conspiracy to
commit such a crime, may be sentenced to a fixed minimum term of
confinement to the custody of the state board of correction, which term
shall be at least five (5) years and may extend to life, for each of the
following aggravating factors found by the trier of fact:
(1) That the defendant has previously been found guilty of or
convicted of a violation of section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), Idaho Code, or
of an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, or an offense
committed in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this
jurisdiction, would be punishable as a violation of section 372732(a)( 1)(A), Idaho Code, or as an attempt or conspiracy to
commit such an offense.

(c)
During a fixed minimum term of confinement imposed
under this section, the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge
or credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct except for meritorious
service. Each fixed minimum term imposed shall be served consecutively
to the others, and consecutively to any minimum term of confinement
imposed for the substantive offense.
I.C. § 37-2739B.

Notably, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, despite the

statute's use of the word "may" instead of "shall," section 37-2739B is mandatory.
State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 918-19, 935 P.2d 174, 181-82 (Ct. App. 1996).
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Prior to Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, he filed a Sentencing Memorandum
arguing that section 37-2732B did not foreclose the possibility of him receiving a rider.
(R., pp.75-84.) His argument was that, even if section 37-2732B is mandatory, in the
sense that it requires the district court to impose the minimum fixed sentence (as the
Court of Appeals held in Ayaia), nothing in that provision requires the district court to

order that sentence into execution. (R., pp.75-84.) He compared section 37-2732B to
I.C. § 19-2514 and argued that, under the rule of lenity, section 37-2732B should not be
read to impose a harsher penalty than its plain language would dictate. (R., pp.75-84.)
At Mr. Patterson's sentencing hearing, the district court heard arguments

on

whether a rider was permissible under section 37-2739B. (See Sent. Tr., p.4, L.24 p.5, L.16, p.14, L.23 - p.19, L.2, p.23, L.15 - p.24, L.17.)

Ultimately, although the

district court made it clear that it was not inclined to grant a rider anyway, it sided with
the State, ruling that section 37-2739B does not permit the district court to retain
jurisdiction. (See Sent. Tr., p.31, L.3- p.33, L.16, p.36, Ls.3-5, p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.3.)
However, the district court did concede that this is an area of the law that is less than
clear, and it encouraged Mr. Patterson to seek appellate review of the issue. (Sent.
Tr., p.37, Ls.20-24.)
Mr. Patterson now contends that the district court's ruling was in error because,

in fact, nothing in section 37-2739B precludes a district court from imposing a fixed
. minimum sentence and either retaining jurisdiction (with the possibility of later
suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on probation) or immediately
suspending the sentence and placing the defendant on probation. In other words, even
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if section 37-27398 requires the district court to impose a fixed minimum sentence,
nothing in that section requires the district court to order that sentence into execution.
As defense counsel below observed, a look at Idaho's persistent violator statute,
I.C. § 19-2514, is instructive. That statute is worded similarly to section 37-27398 in
that it provides that a person convicted of his or her third felony "shall be sentenced to a
term . . . for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life."
I.C. § 19-2514. And that statute has been interpreted to allow the sentencing court to
suspend the imposed sentence and place the defendant on probation.

State v.

Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566-67, 990 P.2d 144,147-48 (Ct. App. 1999). The Court in

that case held that "[w]here there has been no legislative action declaring a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment, thusly canceling a court's power to suspend sentences,
such power to suspend should be preserved." Id. at 566 n.5, 990 P.2d at 147 n.5.
Therefore, under the rule of lenity, which dictates that ambiguities in statutes must be
resolved in favor of the defendant, the persistent violator statute could not be construed
as requiring a mandatory minimum sentence where the Legislature did not expressly
call for it. Id.
Notably, section 37-2739B, and its analoge, Idaho's persistent violator statute,
differ markedly from Idaho's true mandatory minimum requirements, which explicitly
state that the district court does not have discretion to suspend imposition of sentence
or grant the defendant a rider.

See, e.g., I.C. §§ 19-2520G (imposing a five-year

mandatory minimum sentence for certain repeat sex offenders, and specifically stating
that "[a] court shall not have the power to suspend, withhold, retain jurisdiction, or
commute a mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to this section");
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37-27328(a) (imposing various mandatory minimum fixed sentences for drug trafficking,
and specifically stating that "adjudication of guilt or the imposition or execution of
sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"). When one compares section
37-27398 the persistent violator statute to the true mandatory minimums provided for
under Idaho law, it becomes clear that, had the Legislature intended to prohibit
sentencing judges from granting riders or suspending sentences under the former
statutes, it would have said so. Since the Idaho Legislature did not say so in drafting
section 37-27398, sentencing courts imposing the fixed minimum sentences provided
for therein retain their discretion to grant defendants riders and suspend their
sentences. Accordingly, this Court should hold that the district court erred in ruling that
it had no discretion to grant Mr. Patterson a rider in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Patterson respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand his case with an instruction that he be granted a rider
and, thus, given an opportunity to earn a chance to be placed on probation.

Alternatively, if this Court determines that a rider is not possible in this case, he
requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence, or that it find
that his current sentence is excessive and remand his case for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2009.

ERIK R.
HTINEN
Deputy t te Appellate Public Defender
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